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Substance, Procedure, and Institutions in the
International Harmonization of Competition Policy
Daniel A. Crane*
Many people who pay attention to the rapid development of antitrust
regimes across the globe hold two tenets in common. First, most of the relevant
stakeholders would benefit if competition policy could be harmonized
interjurisdictionally.' Second, and alas, this beneficial harmonization is unlikely
to happen on a significant scale in the foreseeable future.2 To many, antitrust
harmonization is thus a noble but utopian aspiration.
I generally share both the former sentiment and the latter lament but both
are far too general to be of much use without further specification. Uniformity
of competition policy is valuable to be sure, but not all facets of harmonization
are created equal. Some aspects of competition policy are in much greater need
of harmonization than others. Also, there is good harmonization and bad
harmonization. We are almost certainly better off with a system of antitrust
heterogeneity with "better" and "worse" systems than we would be with a
uniformly "bad" antitrust system-say, a worldwide regime of small-business
protectionism.
Against this backdrop, I aim to do three things in this essay. First, I identify
areas where harmonization should be a priority and areas where harmonization
is less important. Second, I articulate the preconditions necessary for meaningful
harmonization. Finally, I discuss the feedback loops that can occur between
three different aspects of harmonization-substance, procedure, and
institutions-and suggest an incremental path forward.
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I. HARMONIZATION PRIORITIES
What does the world gain from international antitrust harmonization? In
part, the answer depends on the exact problem that harmonization would
supposedly remedy. Harmonizationists cite many different potential benefits
from increased international homogenization of antitrust norms. Some are more
compelling than others, and sorting through them is necessary in order to
prioritize the difficult tasks ahead.
A. LESS COMPELLING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HARMONIZATION
Some justifications advanced for multilateral antitrust harmonization that
are not particularly compelling include eliminating discrimination against
outsider firms, improving the average quality of antitrust norms, and eliminating
export cartels. Of these, discrimination against foreign firms' access to domestic
markets has received a good bit of attention. This is a real concern with many
egregious illustrations, but it is not primarily an antitrust concern. Antitrust law
tends to be concerned with the acquisition and exercise of market power, and
trade barriers do not necessarily have anything to do with the acquisition of
market power. For example, agricultural trade barriers often take place against a
backdrop of intensely competitive local markets. Further, there are existing
mechanisms under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") to deal with trade barriers that do not rely on
antitrust principles.
The problem of trade barriers does not end with tariffs; there are other
ways to discriminate against foreign firms. A more subtle version of parochial
discrimination occurs when a jurisdiction allows anticompetitive activity in a way
that blocks foreign competitors from accessing the domestic market. A case in
point is the Kodak-Fuji dispute over the distribution of consumer photographic
film and paper distribution in Japan.3 Japan effectively tolerated (and, indeed,
encouraged) vertical exclusive dealing arrangements between manufacturers,
wholesalers, and retailers that made it difficult for US firms like Kodak to access
the Japanese market.
But, again, harmonization of international antitrust enforcement would not
necessarily address this set of problems. Tolerance of anticompetitive
agreements in cases like the Kodak photographic film and paper matter exacts a
toll on domestic consumers and potential domestic entrants to the market as
well. The burden on foreign firms is incidental to the fact that the domestic
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See World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Japan--MeasuresAffehingConsumerPhotographic
Film andPaper 10.378-10.382, WTO Doc No WT/DS44/R (Mar 31, 1998).
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regime may have adopted a poor antitrust policy that also threatens its own
producers and consumers. This is perhaps an example of "bad" antitrust law,
but as noted in the introduction and again below, the arguable dearth of antitrust
law in some jurisdictions is not a sufficient reason to agitate for harmonization.
A more serious international problem is beggar-thy-neighbor exaction of
monopoly rents through the allowance of export cartels. The problem is familiar
from US federalism cases, where the Supreme Court has allowed states to
mandate cartel behavior by their domestic producers who were primarily
exporting out of state. 4 From the short-run perspective of domestic political
regimes, this is a perfectly rational strategy to increase the well-being of local
producers without internalizing the costs of monopoly pricing. Though it is
equally true that the world economy would gain if export cartels were
prohibited, individual jurisdictions are not likely to follow this long-run strategy.
Unlike in the previous Kodak example, the costs of the anticompetitive restraint
are almost entirely exported from the enacting jurisdiction, which means that
there is virtually no domestic political constraint against the adoption and
perpetuation of the restraint.
What is not at all clear is that international harmonization of antitrust
laws-or, at least, harmonization on a multilateral scale-is necessary to curb
the harms of export cartels. Under the dominant "effects test" for antitrust
jurisdiction, domestic authorities are competent to prosecute importers that have
agreed to fix prices in the domestic market, even though the agreement was
transacted in a foreign jurisdiction.' Further, since trading partners often carry a
roughly equal balance of trade, there is no reason why bilateral trade agreements
cannot prohibit export cartels between the signatories.6 Curbing export cartels
may seem like a good idea, but the current level of pressure for economic
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See, for example, Parker v Brown, 317 US 341, 360-61 (1943) (holding that California raisin
prorating regulations that effectively kept the crop out of interstate commerce were still within a
state's power to regulate to preserve local well-being, since the regulation was imposed before
interstate shipment). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism,26 J L
& Econ 23, 24-25 (1983) (acknowledging that federal antitrust laws cannot overcome all state
regulation).
See, for example, Paul B. Stephan, Against International Cooperation, in Epstein and Greve, eds,
Competition Laws in Conflict 66, 82 (cited in note 1).
Disappointingly, the North American Free Trade Agreement does not prohibit export cartels
among the signatory nations and the US implementing legislation explicitly states that the treaty
does not affect the legality of US export cartels. The North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, Statement of Administrative Action, ch 15(B), 103rd Cong, 1st Sess (Nov 3,
1993) in HR Doc No 103-159, vol 1, 450, 623. See also Brendan Sweeney, Export Cartels: Is There a
Need for Global Rules?, 10 J Intl Econ L 87, 104 (2007) (reporting that most bilateral trade
agreements with competition provisions barely address export cartels).
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efficiency does not translate into a strong imperative for multilateral antitrust
harmonization.
One benefit of harmonization would come from the adoption of better
substantive norms. Opponents of harmonization often point out that there is no
reason to believe harmonization will lead to improved antitrust norms.7
However, even supposing that antitrust harmonization increases the average
quality of antitrust laws around the globe through the leveraging of best
practices, experience, and learning, there is no distinctive reason why
harmonization-as-quality-improvement should be more of a goal of antitrust
than of any other mandatory regulatory subject.8 Interjurisdictional sharing of
norms may increase the average quality of domestic law, but this is not a
sufficiently powerful reason to advocate the abandonment of national
sovereignty or distinctiveness on antitrust matters.
B. MORE COMPELLING REASONS FOR HARMONIZATION
A more compelling reason for antitrust harmonization is to alleviate the
burden on international business operations caused by heterogeneous domestic
antitrust norms. In order to determine what forms of antitrust harmonization
yield the greatest benefits, one must view antitrust heterogeneity from the
perspective of the multinational business corporation. In general, the costs of
antitrust heterogeneity fall into two categories: (1) increased transactions costs
arising from the need to comply with multiple jurisdictions' procedural
requirements, and (2) conflicting domestic rules that do not easily mesh with
corporations' legal structures or the technological design of the products they
sell.

1. Complying With Inconsistent Procedural Requirements
The transactions costs of complying with multiple jurisdictions' procedural
requirements arise mostly in the merger context. The costs can be further
subdivided into two types. First, compliance with merger notification
requirements is expensive. For example, one estimate (prepared in 1997 and
therefore somewhat dated) suggests that the preparation of Hart-Scott-Rodino
premerger notification in the US costs about $25,000 for mergers that are not
investigated and $500,000 for mergers that are investigated, not including the

7

See, for example, Stephan, Against InternationalCooperation at 66 (cited in note 5).
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To be sure, the case for harmonization of mandatory regulatory regimes is stronger than for the
harmonization of optional regulatory regimes-such as contract-where firms can choose from a
menu of governing laws. In the latter case, there is essentially a market for good law, and weak
regimes will tend to fail for want of business.
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filing fee or indirect costs.9 Over sixty jurisdictions have merger notification
requirements,'0 and the idiosyncrasies of these various regimes require merging
firms to retain local counsel and report different information for each
jurisdiction covered by the merger. A good deal of waste could be eliminated
through multilateral adoption of a centralized filing system.
A deeper problem is that the variance in merger notification requirements
can delay or even kill beneficial mergers. Country-by-country variances in
notification requirements are so great that putting together an international
merger is becoming very dicey work.
Take, for example, the timing of notification. Some countries have
premerger notification requirements; others have postmerger notification
requirements. This means that sometimes the same stock acquisition must be
notified to the competition authorities and reviewed before it closes in the US
and Europe and only after it closes in Japan and Korea." From the perspective
of international business development, this is the worst of all possible worlds. A
business might reasonably prefer a premerger notification requirement on the
ground that this gives ex ante certainty or it might prefer a postmerger
notification system on the grounds that this prevents delay in the closure of
mergers, but no one would prefer a mixed system where the premerger regimes
delay the transaction and where, even after closing, parties will have no assurance
that their transaction will stand because the postmerger regimes are just getting
started with their own review. A uniform interjurisdictional rule (premerger, in
my opinion) would be far preferable.
2. Inconsistent Treatment of Corporate and Technological Structure
The second major cost of antitrust heterogeneity arises from the conflict
between corporate business or technological structures and local norms.
Consider the wide variety of business practices chosen by an international firm.
Among other things, the firm must choose its corporate structure, develop its
product, hire employees, select distribution methods, and enter into contracts
with upstream suppliers and downstream customers. For the firm operating in
many different jurisdictions, some of these practices can be fairly easily

10

See Joe Sims and Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on Merger
Practice:A Case Study in the Law of Unintended ConsequencesApplied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 Antitrust
LJ 865, 891-92 (1997).
International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant
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Attorney General for Antitrust, Final Report 89 (Feb 28, 2000), available online at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/chapter3.pdf> (last visited Apr 15, 2009).
Country-by-country merger requirements are collected by the International Competition
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Network, available
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conformed to local requirements and some cannot. For example, complying
with local labor requirements (such as minimum wage and employee benefit
laws) may be somewhat expensive, but one country's idiosyncratic requirements
do not affect the firm's ability to operate in other jurisdictions.
Antitrust law does not typically address labor relations, but it does often
address vertical contracting with suppliers or customers. Antitrust regimes
around the world have a variety of different-and often conflicting-norms
with respect to such issues as exclusive dealing, franchisee rights, loyalty rebates,
predatory pricing, and intellectual property licensing terms. While an
international firm's general counsel may find it annoying to have to learn each
country's idiosyncratic antitrust requirements and conform local contracting
accordingly, there is relatively little spillover from one country to another. With
some exceptions, a country can seal off the contagion of bad antitrust norms
outside its borders because contracting is adaptable on a country-by-country
basis.
The case is very different when it comes to corporate structure and
technological design. When the EU blocked General Electric's acquisition of
Honeywell, this meant that the merger could not be consummated in the US
either (even though the US Department of Justice ("DOJ") had cleared the
deal). 2 The EU thus made industrial policy not only for Europe, but also for the
US.
There are two serious downsides to this sort of "everyone for himself"
approach to merger policy. For one, it means that the significant economy with
the most restrictive merger policy dictates industrial policy to the rest of the
world. 3 Since there is no reason to believe that the lowest common
denominator is usually the optimal outcome, a system that tends toward the
lowest common denominator is likely to produce an unfortunate number of
false positives-in other words, to disallow mergers that should be allowed.
But the problem is worse than that. Merger control is not just a "thumbs
up, thumbs down" process. It frequently involves negotiation between
competition authorities and the merging parties over divestiture packages and
conduct remedies. Each competition authority has disproportionate leverage to
exact concessions favorable to its own jurisdiction-for example, a promise not
to close a domestic plant, a commitment to treat a local competitor with special

12

See Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell: The U.S. Merger that Europe Stopped-A Stoy of the Politics of

13

Convergence, in Eleanor M. Fox and Daniel A. Crane, eds, Antitrust Stories 331, 338, 355
(Foundation 2007).
I say significant economy because the merging parties might decide to cease doing business in any
insignificant jurisdiction that tried to hold up the deal.
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favor-because each authority has the power to hold up the entire merger. 4 In
this sense, the international merger landscape raises the same kind of holdout
problems that justify granting eminent domain powers to the government. An
international merger regime that allowed a central authority to eliminate these
collective-action obstacles to efficient mergers would improve the welfare of all
countries and their consumers.
A semi-international example of a government's use of merger control to
exact concessions occurred in 2001 when the Arkansas-based retailer Wal-Mart
tried to acquire the Puerto Rican supermarket chain Supermercados Amigo. 5
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") resolved antitrust concerns by
requiring a spin-off of four stores to an up-front buyer.' 6 Nonetheless, the
Puerto Rican Secretary of Justice, fearing "that Wal-Mart would shift its
purchases away from local suppliers and that the merger would eliminate Puerto
Rican jobs," sued in the Puerto Rican courts under the Puerto Rican AntiMonopoly Act to enjoin the merger. 7 She then sought to settle by exacting
promises that Wal-Mart would retain Supermercados Amigo's employees and
continue purchasing from local suppliers. 8
The Supermercados Amigo debacle is only quasi-international, because
Puerto Rico is a partially autonomous US commonwealth subject to the
constraints of the US Constitution. Wal-Mart was able to secure a federal district
court injunction against the Justice Secretary's attempted exactions on the
ground that they likely violated the "negative" or "dormant" commerce clause of
the US Constitution, which generally prohibits a state (or a commonwealth)
from discriminating against interstate commerce. 9 As antitrust jurisdictions

14

See, for example, Richard M. Brunell, The Social Costs of Mergers: Restoring 'Local Control"As a Factor
in MergerPoligy, 85 NC L Rev 149, 192-93 n 158 (2006) (reporting that the Justice Department has
taken local interests into account in deciding where to allocate bank divestitures from merger
remedies). See also Bruce M. Owen, Book Review, ImportedAntitrust, 21 YaleJ Reg 441, 451 n 37
(2004), reviewing Michal S. Gal, Competition PoligforSmall Market Economies (Harvard 2003).
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See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v Rodrigue., 238 F Supp 2d 395, 403-14 (D Puerto Rico 2002), remanded
with instructions to vacate and dismiss with prejudice 322 F3d 747, 750 (1st Cir 2003) (ordering
the district court's order vacated without reconsidering its factual findings). The story of the
Supermercados Amigo acquisition is told in Eleanor M. Fox, An Anti-Monopoy Law for ChinaScaling the Walls of Government Restraints,75 Antitrust L J 173, 183-84 (2008).
See Wal-Mart Stores, 238 F Supp 2d at 399 ("Wal-Mart came to an understanding of what the
FTC's expectations were before they would free the transaction of antitrust concerns.").
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Fox, 75 Antitrust LJ at 183 (cited in note 15).
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Wal-Mart Stores, 238 F Supp 2d at 414-16, 422. Although the First Circuit eventually ordered the
district court to vacate this injunction, it did so largely because both parties settled and filed a joint
brief requesting vacatur. Accordingly, the First Circuit never reconsidered the merits of the
injunction. See Wal-Mart Stores, 322 F3d at 749-50.
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proliferate globally, however, it is not difficult to imagine many more such
instances arising with no dormant commerce clause backstop. Further, the
parochialism in Supermercados Amigo was easy to identify. In the future, wellschooled antitrust agencies may find more subtle ways to exact localist favors
without triggering WTO scrutiny on discrimination grounds. Only slightly less
problematic than heterogeneous treatment of corporate structure is
heterogeneous treatment of a company's technology. When antitrust
jurisdictions impose differing requirements on a firm's technological design, this
can greatly increase the costs of selling a single product around the world, create
artificial incompatibility, and chill technological innovation.
A ready example is the EU's insistence that Microsoft "unbundle" its PC
operating system, Windows, and its media player.2 ° The European Commission's
("EC") decision effectively required Microsoft to redesign its operating system
for the European market, since Microsoft was permitted to continue to carry the
"bundled" version of Windows in the rest of the world. In 2005, Microsoft
complied with the EC's decision and began to make available "Windows XP
Home Edition N," with the "N" conspicuously and clumsily-as if to make the
point-standing for "not with Media Player." Although the European Court of
First Instance eventually affirmed the Commission's decision, 21 "Edition N"
proved highly unpopular with original equipment manufacturers serving the
European market and very few installed it on their computers. Microsoft thus
redesigned its operating system for the European market only to find no takers.
Another example is France's quixotic battle with Apple's iPod media
player. Ostensibly to prevent music piracy, Apple's iTunes online music store
embeds music download files with code that only allows iTunes songs to be
played on iPods.22 In 2004, Virgin Media accused Apple of abusing its
dominance by linking its downloaded music with its MP3 player.23 The French
Competition Commission rejected the claim, 24 but France passed legislation in
2006 that would have required Apple to allow songs sold on iTunes to be played

20

21

22

23

24

See Commission Decision of 24.03.2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), C(2004)900 final at 300 (Commission of the European
Communities Apr 21, 2004), available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/
antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf> (last visited Apr 15, 2009).
Microsoft Corp v Commission of the EuropeanCommuniies, 5 CMLR 11, TI 1088-90, 1167 (Eur Ct First
Instance 2007).
See Deana Sobel, A Bite out of Appl? iTunes, Interoperability, and France'sDadvsi Law, 22 Berkeley
Tech L J 267, 267-68 (2007).
See Daryl Lim, Beyond Microsoft: IntellectualPropefj, PeerProduction and the Law's Concern with Market
Dominance, 18 Fordham Intel Prop, Media, & Enter L J 291, 317 (2008).
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on other MP3 players.25 In response, Apple threatened to pull its iTunes service
out of France altogether rather than create a different digital rights system for
the French market.2 6 France subsequently softened the legislation, thus
seemingly mooting the controversy, but this kind of confrontation seems
increasingly likely in a technologically interconnected world.
Technological heterogeneity is vexing enough when created by differences
in extralegal factors including custom, culture, history, independent
development, turf protection, and accident. International standardization bodies
like the International Organization for Standardization ("ISO") work hard to
reverse these effects. However, though preventing artificial technological
heterogeneity is a valuable goal, some preconditions need to be in place in order
to achieve this objective.
II. PRECONDITIONS FOR MEANINGFUL HARMONIZATION
The kind of international antitrust harmonization necessary to facilitate
international business transactions faces a number of serious obstacles. Effective
harmonization requires not only convergence on substance and procedure but
also the creation of international antitrust institutions. Any such institution will
27
necessarily be technocratic-expert and not directly politically responsive.
Although there are examples of non-technocratic international institutions-for
example, the United Nations General Assembly or the Security Council-there
would be no sense in trying to create a politically responsive international
antitrust institution. Modern antitrust analysis is dense, technical, difficult, and
not the sort of discipline that lends itself to negotiation and deal-cutting in
fifteen-member councils manned by career politicians. Effective international
antitrust harmonization means agreeing on governing norms and committing
them to the administration of politically independent economists and
economically informed lawyers.
Before such harmonization can unfold, at least three formidable
preconditions must be satisfied. 28 A primary precondition is a general political
consensus on the legitimacy both of market economies and of governmental
controls on market economies. International technocratic administration of any
aspect of antitrust is impossible so long as any participating country continues to
25

See id at 317-18 n 132.

26

Nika Aldrich, A System of Logo-Based Disclosureof DRM on DownloadProducts, 8 J High Tech L 57, 62
n 30 (2008).
On the meaning of technocracy, see Daniel A. Crane, Technocray and Antitrust, 86 Tex L Rev 1159,
1162 (2008).
See id at 1211-16 (discussing these criteria as preconditions to a technocratic shift in antitrust

27
28

enforcement).
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face deep political ambivalence about whether private ownership and
management of the means of production is legitimate and whether the
government may legitimately intervene to correct failures of the private
enterprise system. So long as these questions remain deeply controversial, it will
be impossible to entrust antitrust decision making to experts on an international
level. The existence and stability of an antitrust regime assumes the legitimacy of
a regulated market economy, an assumption still very much in doubt in many
corners of the globe.
Second, harmonizing jurisdictions must agree on a common answer to
antitrust's great existential questions: why do we have antitrust laws and for
whose benefit do we enforce them? It will do no good to agree on modes of
antitrust analysis (that is, rule of reason, premerger notification, HirfindahlHirschman Index) without agreeing on why and for whose benefit the relevant
technocrats are undertaking the endeavor.
Answering these existential questions is difficult enough within a mature
antitrust jurisdiction like the US. 29 It is far more difficult to achieve a consensus
on these questions across multiple jurisdictions that have very different
understandings about why antitrust law exists. Consider, for example, the
contrast between the ostensible goals of antitrust law in the US and the EU. The
essential purpose of the antitrust provisions in the Treaty of Rome is the
creation of a European common market, whereas the essential purpose of the
Sherman Act (at least in its modern iteration) is to enhance economic efficiency
and consumer welfare.30 Whereas common markets often do enhance efficiency,
the EU's distributive concerns sometimes lead to results that would be anathema
in the US. 3' To be sure, transatiantic differences sometimes reflect disagreement
over means rather than ends, 32 but sometimes results look different simply
because the two antitrust regimes are pursuing different goals.
Harmonizing goals is no easy task because goals are highly historically
contingent. The Sherman Act and the Treaty of Rome grew out of two very
different historical circumstances. The Treaty of Rome was framed against a
backdrop of two disastrous world wars that wreaked havoc on the European
continent. Hence, the Treaty's primary goal was political--to prevent another

29

Id at 1211-12.

30
31

Compare text accompanying note 33 (discussing the Treaty of Rome's background), with text
accompanying note 34 (addressing the Sherman Act's creation).
See Aditi Bagchi, The PoliticalEconomyof MergerRegulation, 53 Am J Comp L 1, 11-12 (2005).

32

For example,

in the GE/Honeywell

matter, Mario Monti, the European Competition
Commissioner, defended the European view as being in line with the US consumer welfare
approach insofar as goals were concerned. Fox, GE/Honeywell at 343-44 (cited in note 12).
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world war.33 The Treaty used economics as an instrument to achieve the political
end-binding the European nations together economically, so that their fates
and fortunes were intertwined.
Historically, the US also needed to use economics instrumentally to bind
together its obstreperous states, but it did not choose an antitrust policy to do
so. For example, nothing bound the Union together so much as the creation of
Alexander Hamilton's national bank, which issued debt to so many
constituencies that the failure of the bank would have meant the
impoverishment of a wide swath of American society. The framing of the
Sherman Act did share one similarity with the Treaty of Rome, however-it
occurred within a generation of a disastrous war (the US Civil War that ended
34
twenty-five years before the framing of the Sherman Act). But even prior to
the Civil War, the US already possessed the legal tools necessary to achieve a
common market-particularly the power of Congress over interstate commerce
and the dormant commerce clause, which prohibited states from discriminating
against interstate commerce. Unlike the Treaty of Rome, the Sherman Act was
not a political antidote to war, but a statute with genuinely economic goals.
We may add to this short account of Europe and the US that many
emerging antitrust jurisdictions have their own historical circumstances that
shape their own competition policy goals. Russia has moved forward cautiously
with competition policy, "liberalizing" its economy through a mixture of
underenforced competition laws and a price-regulatory "natural monopolies"
law.3" China relies on economic growth to maintain its holy grail of political
stability and sees antitrust law as a driver of economic growth.36 In this calculus,
producer surplus may count far more than consumer surplus. India's new
competition act lists the "economic development of the country" as a goal of the

33

See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Mar 25, 1957), art 2, 298 UN
Treaty Ser 11, 15 ("It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the
Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced
expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer
relations between its Member States.").

34

See Sherman Act, 26 Stat 209-10 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 1-7 (2006).

35

See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Compeliion Law and Poligy in
at
online
available
(OECD 2004),
14
11,
OECD Peer Review
Russia: An
20 055
15.pdf> (last visited Apr 17, 2009).
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/60/3
See Zhenguo Wu,Perspectives on the Chinese Anti-Monopo~y Law, 75 Antitrust L J 73, 79 (2008) ("The
anti-monopoly legislation should promote the further integration of Chinese practice with the
international market rules, make Chinese economic growth more attuned to the requirements of
economic globalization, and better integrate China into the development patterns of the global
economy.').

36
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law, which may result in permitting anticompetitive activities that ostensibly
contribute to "development" goals.37
Differing historical foundations do not mean that shared normative goals
cannot be achieved over time. Antitrust's existential purpose need not become
frozen at the time of the regime's creation. The ostensible goals of US antitrust,
for example, have changed and adapted considerably over time. Such
convergence on an international scale is possible as well. Indeed, some
convergence on the existential question may be occurring already.38
A final precondition for the success of global harmonization is the
adoption of a mode of antitrust analysis that does not require decisionmakers to
entertain explicit distributive considerations as among identifiable interest
groups-particularly interest groups with a nationally defined character. The
technocratic competence of an international antitrust tribunal or agency would
be shattered the moment it was directed to decide, for example, whether a
merger that would entail reduced competition and price increases in the Russian
market should be allowed because it would also entail enhanced competition and
price reductions for consumers in the Canadian market. Technocrats simply
have no politically legitimate way of deciding how much weight to give the
interests of Russian or Canadian consumers and producers. These are inherently
political questions.39
Fortunately, there are modes of antitrust law that do not rely on such interinterest-group balancing. In its PhiladelphiaNationalBank decision,4 ° the Supreme
Court rejected the merging banks' arguments that any anticompetitive effects to
retail banking customers in the Philadelphia markets would be more than offset
by the fact that the increased lending limits of the merged bank would allow it to
better compete with New York City banks that served large Philadelphia
businesses. The Court rejected the suggestion that "anticompetitive effects in
41
one market could be justified by procompetitive consequences in another.",

40

Aditya Bhattacharjea, India'sNew Competiton Law: A ComparativeAssessment, 4 J Competition L &
Econ 609, 627 (2008).
Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance:A Case Study of InternationalAnitrustRegulation, 39
Stan J Ind L 207, 223 (2003) ("[T]he diverse goals that countries pursue through antitrust laws
have in some ways converged in recent years."), citing Julian Epstein, The Other Side of Harmony:
Can Trade and Competition Laws Work Together in the InternationalMarkeplace?, 17 Am U Ind L Rev
343, 358-59 (2002).
In theory, the international regulators might try to balance the harm to one group against the
gains to another group and only permit the merger if the gains exceed the harms. It is very
unlikely, however, that such a mode of analysis in the hands of politically unresponsive
technocrats would enjoy political legitimacy-particularly given that the measurements of the
costs and benefits would be predictive and less than exact.
United States v PhiladephiaNati Bank, 374 US 321 (1963).

41

Id at 370.

37
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The US antitrust enforcement agencies generally continue to follow this
principle, evaluating competitive effects42market by market and insisting on relief
that makes whole each affected market.
Antitrust law is not devoid of distributive consequences. Indeed, antitrust
enforcement should have distributive consequences-particularly preventing
avoidable wealth transfers from consumers to producers. But there is a
difference between a regulatory regime having distributive consequences and the
assignment of a regulatory analytical mode that requires inter-interest-group
balancing. As I have argued here and elsewhere,43 such balancing is not inherent
in modern antitrust law. If international antitrust harmonization is to succeed,
such balancing must be excluded in favor of a single-minded antitrust mode that
narrowly focuses on identifying and remedying concentrations of economic
power with anticompetitive effects in defined relevant markets. Creating
international antitrust institutions with a political mandate would be a recipe for
disaster.
III. FEEDBACK LOOPS BETWEEN SUBSTANCE, PROCEDURE,
AND INSTITUTIONS
If effective antitrust harmonization cannot succeed so long as the
international community falls short of the criteria articulated in the previous
section-political acceptance of regulated capitalism, agreement on antitrust
ends, and an analytical mode free from explicit balancing of constituent
interests-it is no wonder that there is so much pessimism about
harmonization's prospects. Prospects for achievement of the first two criteria, in
particular, seem remote. Further, general ideological acceptance of regulated
capitalism so far exceeds the set of questions with which antitrust is concerned
that the antitrust community is at the mercy of broader global currents. For one,
the present economic crisis may, in a year or two, have uncontrollable and
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See Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines §
4 n 36 (rev ed 1997), noting that:
[Tjhe Agency normally assesses competition in each relevant market affected
by a merger independently and normally will challenge the merger if it is likely
to be anticompetitive in any relevant market. In some cases, however, the
Agency in its prosecutorial discretion will consider efficiencies not strictly in
the relevant market, but so inextricably linked with it that a partial divestiture
or other remedy could not feasibly eliminate the anticompetitive effect in the
relevant market without sacrificing the efficiencies in the other market(s).
Inextricably linked efficiencies rarely are a significant factor in the Agency's
determination not to challenge a merger. They are most likely to make a
difference when they are great and the likely anticompetitive effect in the
relevant market(s) is small.

43

Crane, 86 Tex L Rev at 1213-14 (cited in note 27).
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unpredictable effects on the politics of global antitrust far greater than antitrust
reformers could achieve or undo in a lifetime.
Nonetheless, the antitrust community is not entirely impotent to press
toward international harmonization. There are a number of small, incremental
steps that could be taken at present. Although these steps could not by
themselves or jointly usher in an era of antitrust homogeneity, they could begin
to set the stage for future harmonization if or when the preconditions begin to
materialize.
The key to such incremental stage-setting is to understand the relationship
between harmonization's moving parts and to approach them strategically.
International antitrust harmonization has three prongs: substance, procedure,
and institutions. Ultimately, an optimal international antitrust regime requires
some uniformity in all three prongs, although sequential development may be
possible.
Procedure and substance are interrelated categories and any effort to
harmonize one without the other will result in frustration. Suppose, for example,
that there was a uniform antitrust code of substantive norms applicable to all
major economies and yet each country was free to specify its own procedural
norms. The practical meaning of the substantive norms would continue to be
widely divergent based on each country's choice of procedure. For example,
stringent pleading rules in cartel cases prior to discovery could severely limit the
number of cartel cases brought, or restrict such cases to causes of action based
on governmental enforcement despite the theoretical availability of a private
right of action. 4 A rule that allocated the burden of proof to the defendant to
prove efficiencies in a merger case would result in a very different merger regime
than one that required the government to disprove the existence of efficiencies.4 5
The same is true of institutions. Even with uniform substantive and
procedural rules, results would be heterogeneous without the commitment of
decisionmaking to international institutions. This is not to say that it is
impossible for fairly uniform law to develop across adjacent sovereign
institutions with a common cultural reference point. The development of US
common law in fifty sovereign state-court systems provides proof that the law
can develop fairly uniformly given virtually identical procedural codes and
continual cross-reference on substantive norms. But the uniformity of US
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Consider Bell Atlantic Corp v Twomb#, 127 S Ct 1955, 1965-66 (2007) (articulating pleading
requirements in cartel cases that prevent plaintiffs from getting access to discovery until they have
plausible evidence of the existence of a conspiracy).
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Burdens of proof straddle substance and procedure. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr. and George
Rutherglen, Deforming the FederalRules: An Essay on What's Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 Va
L Rev 707, 729 (2006).
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common law despite the dispersion of sovereign decisionmaking is attributable
to the shared legal culture of US judges across the states. Elite US judges are
often products of national law schools with a national curriculum that pays
relatively little attention to interstate idiosyncrasies. Judges from different
countries interpreting and implementing an international treaty would not be
able to draw on this sort of shared legal culture and could not be expected to
develop a uniform body of competition law across national borders. National
judges from different countries are known to give very different interpretations
to the same treaty.46 Of course, lower federal court judges often differ on the
meaning of federal treaties, statutes, or the constitution as well, but at least in a
unified federal system there is an institution-the Supreme Court-with
corrective powers. Without such an institution, the specification of uniform
procedural and substantive norms is unlikely to bring about the kind of antitrust
homogeneity necessary to advance international business.
Ultimately, a well-functioning system of international antitrust law requires
harmonization in the strong sense-some international institution must interpret
and implement the procedural and substantive competition policy norms.
Harmonization ultimately needs to occur on all three fronts, but it need not
occur simultaneously across them. Thus, for example, while substantive
harmonization without procedural harmonization will prove fruitless in the long
run and vice versa, tackling substantive harmonization before tackling
procedural harmonization (or vice versa) is not out of the question. Indeed,
harmonizing one first may make harmonizing the other easier. Shared
understanding of a procedural norm's meaning makes it easier for
decisionmakers to converge on an adjacent substantive norm's meaning.
Of the three prongs, it seems prudent to begin with the harmonization of
procedure. Agreements on procedures seem less threatening to national
sovereignty, less irrevocable, and less of a compromise on ideological principles
than agreement on substantive norms or the delegation of power to international
institutions. At the same time, harmonization of procedures would not only
provide some immediate benefits (such as simplified merger notification) but
would also provide a framework for nations to share formal antitrust norms.
Later agreements on substantive norms and international institutions would be
much easier to accomplish against a history of procedural homogeneity.

46

See, for example, Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive
Incoporationof Human Rights Treaties, 107 Colum L Rev 628, 653-54 (2007) (noting that while the
US Supreme Court confines its use of international human rights treaties to constitutional
interpretation, courts in other common law countries use the same treaties to interpret statutes
and update their common law).
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Proposals for the internationalization of merger procedures, in particular,
are not new. 47 Yet resistance to even procedural harmonization remains deepseated. For instance, in 2000, the DOJ issued an International Competition
Policy Advisory Committee report that contained a lengthy and detailed chapter
on improving international merger procedures. 48 Its recommendations, however,
stopped short of suggesting that jurisdictions formally attempt to harmonize
their procedures. To the contrary, the Advisory Committee expressed the view
that "many of the transaction costs imposed by merger regimes are rationally
related to the efficient review of transactions that have the potential to create
appreciable anticompetitive effects within the reviewing jurisdiction and
therefore should be taken in stride by companies as a cost of doing business."49
Instead of recommending steps toward formal harmonization, the report
recommended that each jurisdiction attempt to follow certain principles in
framing its merger control provisions. Each jurisdiction should attempt to
screen out mergers unlikely to generate appreciable anticompetitive effects
within the reviewing jurisdiction, establish objectively based notification
thresholds, act transparently, retain the authority to challenge mergers that do
not trigger premerger notification requirements, and eschew reliance on merger
notification fees to subsidize the enforcement agencies' budgets. 0
Vague hortatory suggestions such as these are harmless but unlikely to
enhance the efficiency of international business in a significant way. What is
needed, for starters, is a formal multilateral commitment to a merger clearance
process which, even if not centrally managed on substance, would entail
procedural convergence on merger clearance. If a critical mass of major
economies could agree on even a common merger notification form, that would
be a good start. There is no technological reason why multiple enforcement
agencies could not share in a common notification system. For example, the US
has two merger clearance agencies-the FTC and DOJ-with very different
institutional structures and cultures, but they employ a single notification form.
Their electronic filing system allows parties to submit their premerger
notification form electronically via the Internet. Once the notification form has
been processed, it is accessible by both the FTC and DOJ via a shared
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Merit E. Janow, Transatlantic Cooperation on Competition Poliy, in Simon J. Evenett, Alexander
Lehmann, and Benn Steil, eds, Antitrust Goes Global. What Futurefor TransatlanticCooperation?29, 48
(Brookings Institution 2000); Jiurgen Basedow, International Antitrust: From Extraterritorial
Application to Harmonization, 60 La L Rev 1037, 1051 (2000).
International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust, FinalReport at 87-163 (cited in note 10).
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Id at 94-95 (emphasis omitted).
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Id at 155-56.
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database. 5 Although there would have to be some hard detail work and
compromise over such issues as confidentiality, initial disclosures, timing, and
the like, there is no good reason that, for instance, the US, the EU, and some
jurisdictions with similar merger control regimes could not kick off a similar
international system.
The point, of course, is not merely to create an international merger
database. The point is to prove the feasibility of international harmonization
through one procedural step, to extend from there to another procedural step, to
allow success on procedural harmonization to set the stage for some modest
substantive harmonization, and progressively to cede authority to an
international institution on specified questions." That assuredly will not happen
quickly. But it will not happen at all if the small first steps on procedure are not
taken.

IV. CONCLUSION
International antitrust harmonization is not an undifferentiated good and is
not likely to happen on a large scale any time soon. But antitrust homogeneity is
valuable enough to the efficient conduct of international business that it is worth
investing current energy to lay the groundwork for future harmonization.
Beginning with small steps such as a unified international premerger notification
protocol could move us incrementally toward the long-term goal of antitrust
homogeneity for international business.
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See Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, Hart-Scolt-RodinoElectronic FilingSystem
(EFS) (May 13, 2008), available online at <https://www.hsr.gov> (last visited Apr 17, 2009).
For example, success with procedural coordination of premerger notification might pave the way
for a treaty agreement on substantive merger norms for multinational corporations, which could
in turn pave the way for an international body with jurisdiction to regulate mergers involving
international corporations. In time, a positive experience with international regulation of
multinational mergers could set the stage for expansion of the regulatory body's jurisdiction to
adjacent issues, such as international joint ventures.
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